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Utah

Farm

Bureau

Federation

(hereinafter

"Federation"),

a Utah Non-Profit Corporation, having first obtained leave of this
Court pursuant to Rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
to intervene

in and appear

in this case as Amicus Curiae, does

hereby file the following Brief.

While it is not the intention

of the Federation to directly take sides in the specific controversy pending in this case between the County Board of Equalization
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah as Petitioner (hereinafter "Salt
Lake County") and State Tax Commission of Utah, ex rel, Kennecott
Corporation as Respondent

(hereinafter "Kennecott") the positions

advocated in this Brief would likely result in the affirmance of
Formal Decision of the State Tax Commission of Utah issued September 10, 1987, which Decision is the subject of this Appeal,
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Salt Lake County spends much of its Brief arguing the equities of whether a company like Kennecott should be allowed to take
advantage of the Farm Land Assessment Act (hereinafter "FAA") §595-86 et seq. (now 59-2-501 et seq) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended.

The issue in this case, however, is not whether it is

fair in the abstract to allow a property owner like Kennecott to
take advantage of the FAA by leasing property to those who*''will
use them for agricultural purposes.

For the Federation, at least,

the real issue in this case is whether the FAA will be construed
by the Court in such a manner as to fairly implement its purposes.
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Adoption of the statutory construction advanced by Salt Lake County
will subvert rather than implement those statutory purposes.
The fact that a statute which is drafted broadly enough
to cover all those it intended to benefit may also benefit some
who, if looked at standing alone, might be thought to be outside
the class to whom the statute was directed is a matter of policy
for the legislature and not of hair-splitting by the Courts,

it

is up to the legislature to determine whether it is better to provide an occasional benefit to one who doesn't need it rather than
to draw the qualification limits of a statute so narrow that some
who legitimately fall within the class to be benefitted are excluded.
By focusing on the actual physical use to which the property is put rather than the principal business or income of the
owner of the property, the legislature clearly chose the broad
approach.

In making that policy decision the legislature did not

need a crystal ball to recognize that property owners whose principal business is far removed from agriculture could benefit from
the provisions of the FAA.

This should not be offensive, however,

when one recognizes that the purpose of the Act is to provide a
tax incentive for the continued use of lands for agricultural production regardless of who owns them.
In its zeal to construe the FAA in a manner that would exclude industrial landowners like Kennecott from its coverage, Salt
Lake County has suggested to this Court a construction of the
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statute

which

will

put

at

risk

the

very

ranching

and

farming

interests which Salt Lake County appears to suggest the FAA was
intended to protect.

Such tunnel vision leads only to a tilted

view of the statute's application and fails to consider the impact
of such statutory construction on other fact situations.

As an

Amicus Curiae, it is the Federation's purpose in this Brief to
aid

the

Court

in

standing

back

and

examining

the

broader

ramifications of how the FAA should be construed and applied.

ARGUMENT

POINT L
THE FAA IS NOT A TAX EXEMPTION STATUTE SUBJECT TO NARROW CONSTRUCTION.
Salt Lake County cites in its Brief a number of Utah cases
construing

religious and charitable tax exemptions and correctly

concludes from such case law that such tax exemptions are to be
given a narrow construction in favor of the taxing authority and
against the tax payer.

In attempting to apply the precedent of

the tax exemption cases to the facts of this case, however, Salt
Lake County misses the entire point of the FAA.
The FAA exempts no one from the payment of taxes.

It simply

requires the County Assessor to value qualifying property as Agricultural land.

The owner still pays property taxes.

This limita-

tion on the uses for which the qualifying property can be valued
for tax purposes is a legislative expression of the public policy
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of this state that food and fiber production is a desired use of
privately owned lands and is to be encouraged.
Generally speaking,
an act designed to declare and enforce a principal
of public policy, and statutes declaring or determining
public
policy
have
been
liberally
construed.
82 C.J.S. Statutes, §387 at P.917.
designed

with

the

express

Moreover, where a statute is

purpose

and

intent

to promote the

preservation of rights in and to private property or introduces
new regulations or proceedings intended to promote what is perceived to be the public good, such statutes have usually been
construed as remedial in nature and given a liberal construction.
See 82 C.J.S.

Statutes, §388 at P.919.

The legislature itself gave us the best clue as to how the
FAA should be construed when the criteria chosen for inclusion
within coverage of the statute was the use of the property and
not the nature of the user.

The purpose of the FAA as declared

by the legislature is to preserve and encourage the productive
use of real property for agricultural purposes and not the per
se preservation of farmers and ranchers, although such may well
be a side benefit of the FAA.
and

In so choosing this emphasis, the

legislature

clearly

knowingly

chose

a broad

criteria

determining

inclusion within coverage of the statute.

for

To riow

ignore that policy decision by construing the broad language of
the

FAA

narrowly

will

frustrate

legislative intent.
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this

clear

manifestation

of

POINT II
PROPERTY ASSESSED UNDER THE FARM LAND ASSESSMENT ACT IS NOT SUBJECT TO TAXATION UNDER
THE STATE PRIVILEGE TAX.
Following up on its argument that the FAA in fact constitutes a tax exemption, Salt Lake County contends that the difference between what the property could have been assessed at predicated upon its highest and best use and the value at which the
property is assessed as agricultural land, constitutes an exemption
from taxation.

Salt Lake County then argues that since this case

involves real property being put to a beneficial use in connection
with a business for profit, the

"tax exemption" granted

FAA is subject to being taxed under §59-13-73
Utah

Code Annotated,

1953 as amended.

(now

by the

59-4-101)

By that construction of

the privilege tax, Salt Lake County would wipe out the benefits
of

the

FAA

for

all

farmland

property

owners

except

charitable

institutions or non-profit corporations.
Farming clearly is business and, while some farmers might
be heard

to dispute this, it is generally

for profit.

a business organized

If the limitation on the use for which property can

be valued under the FAA is a tax exemption as contended by Salt
Lake County, then every farmer or rancher who puts the property
to beneficial use in his farming or ranching operation, which he
would have to do to come within the FAA, would in turn be subject
to the privilege tax end up paying exactly the same property tax
he would have paid absent the passage of the FAA.
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The result is

nonsensical and could have not been intended by the legislature.
The FAA does not provide a tax exemption

and, accordingly,

the

substitute privilege tax is not applicable.
POINT III.
SALT LAKE COUNTY DRAWS TOO NARROW A CONSTRUCTION OF THE PHRASE "ACTIVELY DEVOTED TO AGRICULTURAL USE" AS USED IN THE FAA.
Section 59-5-89, the form of the FAA in effect in 1985 when
the taxes at issue in this case were levied, provided in pertinent
part:
land which is actively devoted to agricultural use is eligible for valuation, assessment and taxation each year it meets the
following qualifications:
(1)
it has been so devoted for at least
the two successive years immediately preceeding the tax year for which valuation under
this Act is required?
(2) the area of the land is not less than
five contiguous acres . . .[and] the gross
sales
of
agricultural
products
produced
thereon . . .have averaged at least $1,000
per year, not including rental income .
. .

Four

tests

language, each

clearly

emerge

of which must

from

the

foregoing

statutory

be met in order for the property

to qualify for the benefits of the Act.
1.

The property must be
to agricultural use.

2.

The property must have been so devoted
for at least two years preceeding the
taxable year in question.

3.

The property must contain at least five
contiguous acres and;
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actively

devoted

4.

Gross sales of agricultural products
produced on the land must average at
least one thousand dollars per year.

The Act was

amended

in 1987 and renumbered

provisions being substantially rewritten.

with

The qualifications for

application of the FAA are now contained in §59-2-503.
the tests in the new statute have been re-ordered,
virtually

identical.

Accordingly,

several

construction

Although

they remain

of this language

found in the earlier form of the FAA will also determine the meaning of the current statutes.
Three

of

the

objective in nature.
acres

and

produced

four

immediately
measurement

the

average

land

of

preceeding
and

outlined

above

are

essentially

Whether the property contains five contiguous

generated

on

tests

at
two

reasonably

sales
least
years

easy

from

agricultural

$1,000.00
is

proof.

per

subject
Likewise,

year
to

products
for

the

objective

whether

the

property meets the two consecutive years of agricultural use test
is essentially an objective test once the issue of what constitutes
the required
expected

agricultural

use has been determined.

in most cases, the three objective

As might be

tests have been met

in the instant case and there is no dispute regarding the ability
of Kennecott to satisfy those tests.
This case, as does the statute itself, turns on the meaning
of "actively devoted to agricultural use."

That phrase is found

nowhere else in the FAA and the legislature has not provided us
with any express definition of that term.

-7-

Notwithstanding these

deficiencies, the term

is not

as difficult

to

construe

as Salt

Lake County would have the Court believe.
Salt Lake County, arguing principally from the narrow construction cases dealing with chartiable and religious tax exemptions, contends that "actively devoted to" is nearly the equivalent of "used exclusively for."
the property can accommodate

Salt Lake County does admit that

some deminimus non-agricultural use

but argues that such use must be clearly incidential to the unequivocable primary use of the property for agricultural purposes.
While that test may somewhat overstate the meaning of the
subject
County.

phrase

it

is not

the

critical error made by Salt Lak'e

In attempting to define the primary use, Salt Lake County

ignores the actual physical use to which the property is put and
asks this Court to look instead
from the alternative

uses.

to the economic benefit derived

Rather

than

look at the

land, Salt

Lake County would have this Court look at the books.
There are a number of things wrong with the way Salt Lake
County has structured

its test.

Salt Lake County has failed to

recognize that, at least in this part of the country, agriculture
is essentially a seasonal land use.

As a consequence, the princi-

pal or primary use to which a property is "devoted" might be different dependent upon the time of year.

For example, while the

predominant use of corn fields during the spring and summer may
well be to grow corn, the predominant use in the fall after the
corn harvest might well be recreational
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for the hunting of game

birds.

Should the fact that a farmer is able to take what may

be at best a break even or at worst a losing farm operation and
convert

it into a profitable one by the sale of hunting permits

disqualify the land from the FAA coverage simply because the money
generated from the recreational use of the property is more than
what Salt Lake County would classify as a deminimus?

If the pur-

pose of the FAA is to encourage the continued use of real property
for

agricultural

purposes.

The

answer

to that

question

should

be no.
The difficulty in endeavoring to apply the Salt Lake County
test to the real world is perhaps best illustrated by an example.
Assume that the privately owned summer range of a rancher is also
an excellent

fishing

and

hunting

area.

After

several years of

battling with the public over access and tresspass, the rancher
contracts with
its members

a private

exclusive

for hunting and

sportsman's

club giving that

club and

rights of access and use of the property

fishing.

The sportsman's club then assumes the

responsibility of controlling access to the property for recreational purposes and agrees that its recreational use of the property will not unreasonably interfere with the ranching operations.
The sportman's club pays to the rancher a substantial license fee
for this right.
Assume further that the property also provides significant
winter recreational opportunities during the season when the property is not actively used in the ranching operation.
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The winter

recreational use might
cross-country

include

such

skiing and helicopter

things as snowmobile
skiing.

Again,

tours,

in order to

take advantage of the full potential of his property, the rancher
contracts with a recreational tour company who is given the exclusive

right

to control

access

to and use the property

for snow

mobiling, cross-country skiing, and helicopter skiing.

The rancher

is

use.

again

paid

supplemental
captial

significant

licensing

income has allowed

improvements

to

his

fees

for

the rancher

ranching

this

to make

operation

This

significant

resulting

in an

increase in both the efficiency and profitability of his ranch.
Admittedly under these facts, the recreational uses of the
property could not be classified as deminimus.

Moreover, depending

upon such diverse factors as weather, the price of meat, the price
of

feed,

the costs of transportation

and the general conditions

of the economy, there could well be years in which the net income
from

recreational

from the

use

of

the property

ranching operations.

might

exceed

that earned

Under Salt Lake County's view of

the meaning of "actively devoted to" this rancher would lose the
protection

of the FAA

even though without

it, continued

use of

the property as summer range in the ranching operation would not
be cost effective and he would be better off selling the property
for development of summer cabin sites.
This construction

of the Act

it was intended to foster.

jeopardizes

the very policy

An enterprising farmer or rancher who

finds economically beneficial off-season uses and even some contem-
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poraneous non-farming uses for his property could lose the benefit
of the FAA even though the alternative uses are compatible with
the

continued

farming

or

ranching

operation.

Nowhere

does

the

statute imply that the farmer or rancher must chose between the
benefits of the FAA and compatible and non-interfering additional
uses of the property where such compatible alternative uses may
spell

the

difference

between

a profitable

or unprofitable

farm

or ranch.
What then is the appropriate test?

The Federation suggests

that the language of the FAA itself is clear.
physical

use

to which

the property

It is the actual

is being actively

put that

drives the decision as to whether it falls within the scope of
the FAA.

During the agricultural season is the property's primary

physical use agricultural?

Are the concurrent or off-season uses

compatible with the predominant physical use of the property for
agricultural

purposes?

If the answer

to these questions

is in

the affirmative, then the property would meet the test of being
actively devoted to agricultural use.
Salt Lake County tries to justify its narrow test by citation of a wide variety of cases which simply have no application
in the instant matter.

Loyal Order of Moose #259 v. County Board

of Equalization of Salt Lake County, 657 P. 2d 259 (Utah 1982*} "and
Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985)
each deal with the constitutional charitable exemption from taxation.

Rushton Hospital, Inc.

v. Rieser 191 So.2d 665 (La. 1966)
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similarly

deals with

the

Louisiana

constitutional

exemption

for

properties devoted to charitable undertakings•
In the Complaint

of McLinn

744 F.2d

the Court was dealing with a non-taxation

677

(9th Cir. 1984)

statute pertaining to

the control of boating in off-shore Alaskan waters«

Both the facts

and the statute are so foreign to the issues involved in this case,
that the citation of the case is of no precedential value.

Helge-

son v. County of Hennepin, 387 N . W . 2d 408 (Minn. 1986) similarly
deals with a statute that is totally unrelated to the issues in
this case.
The two Florida cases which Salt Lake County cites, Straughn
v. K.K. Land Management, Inc., 326 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1976) and Markham v. Nationwide Development, 349 So.2d 220 (Fla. 1977), although
dealing with the tax preferences

for farm properties, involve a

statute so dissimilar in content and obvious purpose that the construction of that statute can be of little aid in the instant case.
The only two decisions cited by Salt Lake County in which
the term "devoted to" is utilized in circumstances even remotely
similar to those involved in the case at bar, are of Otis Lodge,
Inc. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 206 N.W.2d. 3 (Minn. 1972) and
City of East Orange v. Township of Livingston, 246 A.2d 178 (N.J.
1968).

The test for determining whether property is actively devor

ted to agricultural use as suggested by the Federation hereinabove
is entirely consistent with the holding in both cases.
In

Otis

statute which

Lodge,
provided

the Court was
for a

lower
-12-

called
property

upon

to construe a

tax assessment

for

property that was "devoted to temporary and seasonal residential
occupancy

for

recreational

purposes."

In construing

the term

"devoted", the Court found that the term meant "chiefly" used for
and not "wholly" used for.

The Court emphasized, however, that

in determining whether or not property was chiefly used for a
particular purpose, the Court must "clearly"

look to "the use

to which it is actually put, not the use or uses to which the property may be put." [Emphasis added.]
In City of East Orange, the Court construed the New Jersey
Farm Land Assessment Act and specifically the phrase "actively
devoted to agricultrual or horticultural use."

The City of East

Orange had acquired certain watershed property in an effort to
protect the municipal water supply of the city.

The property was

clearly managed for watershed purposes although one of the incidental benefits of that management was that the city was able to
sell some of the timber cut from the watershed property.

The city

contended that the sale of such timber constituted the sale of
agricultural products which had been grown on the property qualifying the property for special assessment.
In rejecting the position of the City, it is clear that
the New Jersey Court did exactly what has been suggested here by
the Federation.

The Court looked at the actual physical use to

which the property was put and concluded that the protection of
the watershed not the growing of agricultural products was the
predominant physical use of the property.
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The Court observed,

for example, that decisions of when and where to plant, cultivate,
and harvest trees were not made on the basis of some market need
for lumber but were made predicated
watershed preservation plan.

upon a tightly controlled

The fact that some of the trees har-

vested could be sold as lumber did not change the nature of the
dominant physical use to which the property was put.
Two cases which Salt Lake County, for obvious reasons, does
not site, illustrate the point made herein by the Federation.
Ritch v. Department of Revenue, 493 P.2d

38 (Ore.

In

1972) the

Supreme Court of Oregon was called upon to construe its own version
of the Farm Land Assessment Act.

Oregon's Department of Veterans

Affairs had leased approximately 96,000 acres to the Boeing Corporation

for industrial research

or development purposes.

2,000

of the acres were being used by Boeing for industrial development
with the remaining 94,000 acres being sub-leased to four ranchers
living in the area.

One of the purposes for which Boeing had

leased the 96,000 acres was to provide a "buffer zone for noise
suppression between the test areas and privately owned property."
The lower court had denied special farm use assessment to
the owner of the property on the basis that the predominant use
of the property was as an industrial buffer zone and not agriculture.

In reversing the lower court, the Oregon Supreme Court held

that it was "the use that is actually being made of the property"
that determined whether or not the Farm Land Assessment applied.
493 P.2d at 41.

The Court found that if the actual physical use
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of the property was for farming purposes, then the property was
"devoted to farm use" regardless of the reasons for which the property was actually

acquired

or the other benefits which may be

derived from its possession or ownership.
The Court in Marshall v. Town of Newington, 156 Conn239 A. 2d 478

107,

(1968) was similarly called upon to review a lower

court's denial of the benefit of assessment of land as farm land.
The basis for the lower court's decision was that the parcels in
question were part of a larger industrial tract owned by the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff had requested the zoning of the entire tract

as industrial and the revenues derived from the permitted industrial uses of the larger tract far outweighed the meager income
earned from growing corn on the parcels in question.
In

reversing

the

lower

court

decision,

the

Connecticut

Supreme Court found that it was "the actual use to which the land
was being put, which is the criterium the statute specifies" which
the court must look to in determining whether the land should be
classified for property tax assessment purposes as farm land.
A. 2d

481.

To hold

otherwise,

the Court

found, would

239

frustrate

the public policy underlying Farm Land Assessment statutes which
was to
encourage the preservation of farm land in
order to maintain a readily available source
of food and farm products close to the metropolitan areas of the state and to prevent
the forced conversion of farm land to more
intensive uses as a result of economic pressures caused by the assessment of the land
for purposes of property taxation at values
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incompatible with their preservation as farm
land.
CONCLDSION
In

determining

whether

property

is

"actually

devoted

to

agricultural use" the test should be whether the actual predominant
physical

use

of

for agricultural

the property
purposes.

during

The fact

the agricultural
that during

season is

the off-season

the property may have alternative uses compatible with its agricultural use or may even have concurrent compatible uses should not
deny agricultural

assessment

if the predominant

the property remains for agricultural purposes.

physical use of

The economic bene-

fit derived by the owner from compatible off-season or concurrent
uses should not be the test.
It is clear that the Formal Decision of the Utah State Tax
Commission
test

from which

in finding

assessed

under

that

this

appeal was

the property

the FAA.

taken applied

in question

Accordingly,

the proper

should

that decision

have been

should

be affirmed by this Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of March, 1988.
WATKISS & CAMPBELL
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